Pace Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 1 Fall 2014
Symposium: Social Media and Social Justice

Article 8

September 2014

The Constitution and Revenge Porn
John A. Humbach
Pace University School of Law, jhumbach@law.pace.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, First Amendment Commons,
Internet Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 Pace L. Rev. 215 (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/8
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

The Constitution and Revenge
Porn
John A. Humbach*
“Many are those who must endure speech they do not like, but
that is a necessary cost of freedom.”1
Revenge porn refers to sexually explicit photos and videos
that are posted online or otherwise disseminated without the
consent of the persons shown, generally in retaliation for a
romantic rebuff.2 The problem of revenge porn seems to have
emerged fairly recently,3 no doubt facilitated by the widespread
practice of sexting.4 In sexting, people make and send explicit
pictures of themselves using digital devices.5 These devices, in
their very nature, permit the pictures to be easily shared with
the entire online world. Although the move from sexting to
revenge porn might seem as inevitable as the shifting winds
* Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law.
1. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669 (2011).
2. See State 'Revenge Porn' Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Aug.
15,
2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/state-revenge-porn-legislation.aspx.
3. There were relatively few searches on the term “revenge porn” until
about 2013, when searches on the term skyrocketed. See Revenge Porn,
GOOGLE TRENDS, http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=revenge%20porn
(last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
4. See, e.g., David Rosen, We Are All Sexters Now: America’s Favorite
Amateur
Porn,
SALON
(Aug
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.salon.com/2014/08/16/we_are_all_sexters_now_americas_favorite_
amateur_porn. According to a 2010 survey, 43% of teens and 28% of parents
engaged in sexting behavior. Stephanie Steinberg, 'Sexting' Surges
Nationwide, and It's Not Just Teens Doing It, USA TODAY (July 20, 2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/2010-07-21texting21_ST_N.htm. The numbers are likely larger today. See Matthew
Mientka, 'Sexting' Now Mainstream as Half of U.S. Adults Send and Receive,
MED. DAILY (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.medicaldaily.com/sexting-nowmainstream-half-us-adults-send-and-receive-268703.
5. For my earlier discussion of sexting, see John A. Humbach, “Sexting”
and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010).
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and tides of amorous affection, people have been caught offguard,6 and revenge porn has become a significant item of
moral and legal concern.7
The inherent repulsiveness of revenge porn has led to calls
for laws making it a crime and, as of this writing, at least ten
states have enacted statutes to prohibit revenge-porn
Moreover, an important article offering
dissemination.8
“recommendations to lawmakers working to criminalize
revenge porn” was recently published by Professors Danielle
Keats Citron (University of Maryland) and Mary Anne Franks
(University of Miami).9 While there are variations in the
6. Both men and women are reportedly victimized by revenge porn.
Cynthia J. Najdowski, PhD, and Meagen M. Hildegrand, The Criminalization
of ‘Revenge Porn’, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 26
(2014), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/01/jn.aspx. However,
while “[m]en are more likely than women to report being victims of this
online privacy invasion[,]” id. (citation omitted), it has been argued that the
impact on women may be greater because “[w]hen it comes to sexual
expression, females are denied the freedoms enjoyed by men.” Emily
Poole, Hey Girls, Do you Know? Slut-Shaming on the Internet Needs to Stop,
48 U.S.F. L. Rev. 221, 222 (2013). The unfortunate social reality is that, for
women whose conduct “do[es] not conform with traditional gender
expectations,” “slut shaming remains a tremendous problem.” Id. at 231-32.
It “not only demeans women, but it also highlights the sexual double
standard rampant in our society.” Id. at 232. “The emotional harms caused
by slut-shaming [including revenge porn] can follow a woman around for
years, damage her self-perception, and possibly cause her either to dismiss
her own sexuality or be labeled as easy . . . .” Id. at 232-33 (emphasis in
original).
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Fighting Back Against Revenge Porn, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2013, at SR10; Erica Goode, Once Scorned, But on Revenge Sites,
Twice Hurt, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23, 2013, at A11; Lorelei Laird, Victims Are
Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They Did Not Consent
To,
A.B.A.
(Nov.
1,
2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_are_taking_on_revenge_
porn_websites_for_posting_photos_they_didnt_c; David Schwartz, Arizona
Governor Signs Legislation to Discourage 'Revenge Porn,' REUTERS (Apr. 30,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/01/us-usa-arizonarevengeporn-idUSBREA4000T20140501.
8. See State ‘Revenge Porn’ Legislation, supra note 2; see, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West
2004). Commentator Rachel Budde describes that recent flurry of revenge
porn as exemplifying emotion-driven “crime du jour legislation.” Rachel E.
Budde, Taking the Sting Out of Revenge Porn: Using Criminal Statutes to
Safeguard Sexual Autonomy in the Digital Age, __ GEO. J. OF GENDER & THE
LAW __, 39 (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2424518.
9. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge
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specific provisions of the various revenge porn laws, both as
enacted and proposed, they typically share two key
prohibitions, namely, they forbid:
 images that show sexual exposure or contact, and
 dissemination without consent of persons depicted.
Unfortunately, these two key prohibitions of revenge porn
laws seem to fly directly in the face of the free speech and press
guarantees of the First Amendment.10 In short, the two
prohibitions constitute unconstitutional content discrimination,
viewpoint discrimination and speaker discrimination, not to
mention prior restraint. A restriction on speech that is limited
to particular content, e.g., sexual exposure, is content
discrimination.11
A restriction designed to suppress a
particular point of view, e.g., negative or unflattering personal
information, is viewpoint discrimination.12 And a restriction
that is applicable only to persons who have not received
consent is speaker discrimination,13 as well as a prior
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 386 (2013). In a subsequent publication
on the Social Science Research network, Professor Franks has proposed a
model for revenge porn laws, which reads in principal part:
An actor may not knowingly disclose an image of another,
identifiable person, whose intimate parts are exposed or
who is engaged in a sexual act, when the actor knows or
should have known that the depicted person has not
consented to such disclosure.
Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A Guide for
Legislators 5 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2468823.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 811-12
(2000); Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 118 (1989); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“It
is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys.”).
12. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; see also Wood v. Moss, 134 S.
Ct. 2056, 2069 (2014) (recognizing the rule).
13. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (“[G]overnment regulation may not
favor one speaker over another.”). Actually, the consent requirement results
in both viewpoint discrimination and speaker discrimination by limiting
communication to selected viewpoints and speakers while criminalizing the
rest. The overall effect of consent requirements is to permit positive personal
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restraint—among the most disfavored of restrictions on
speech.14
While the Supreme Court has recognized a number of
circumstances that justify government impingements on free
expression, the Court has been extremely reluctant to permit
speech restrictions that discriminate based on a message’s
content, its viewpoint, or the speaker.15 It has nearly always
refused to tolerate such discrimination unless the case falls
within one of the several historically established exceptions to
First Amendment protection.16 Because of the special place
that the modern First Amendment cases accord to content
discrimination (and the allied discriminations based on
viewpoint and speaker), any statutes designed specifically to
outlaw revenge porn as such17 would seem to face some very
tough sledding—if indeed they can be written in ways that are
constitutionally permissible at all.
At the end of this paper, I propose a possible approach to
crafting a law that addresses the primary harms of revenge
porn, but which seeks avoid the direct affront to the First
Amendment of the revenge porn laws currently proposed and
enacted. Whether this approach would actually work is a
question that cannot be answered with certainty but, unless
the Supreme Court changes the application of the First
Amendment to accommodate revenge porn, I think its chances
are at least better than the statutes, drafts and proposals to
date.
I.

Basic Meaning of the First Amendment

information to be communicated by approved speakers while suppressing
disapproved negative private information. See also Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (disapproving a law that enacted “contentand speaker-based restrictions” on the disclosure of private physicianprescribing information).
14. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); infra Part II.B.
17. I.e., statutes whose prohibition is limited to sexually explicit images
disseminated without consent.
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The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”18
The basic meaning of this clause is, of course, to restrict the
government’s power.19 Specifically, the Free Speech Clause
restricts the government’s power to address a particular class
of potentially harmful conduct—namely, conduct that consists
of speech. This limitation on the government’s power to deal
with harms caused by speech is in distinct contrast with the
broad power that the government has to deal with social harm
generally.
With respect to most kinds of harm, governmental bodies
are traditionally deemed to have the power to restrict private
liberty “wherever the public interests demand it,”20 and
legislatures possess “a large discretion . . . to determine, not
only what the interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.” 21
Under what is known as the “rational basis” test, the rule is
that “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”22 The “rational
basis” test is, in other words, an expression of the judiciary’s
broad deference to the legislative branch to decide what the
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But,
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.”). See also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010);
Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (a “check” on
legislative power).
20. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
21. Id.
22. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-35 (1954); see also Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (under the rational basis test, it
“suffices if the law could be thought to further a legitimate governmental
goal, without reference to whether it does so at inordinate cost”). The Court
has, in other words, expressly abandoned the former idea that the
legislature’s “determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
courts.” Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“The existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in
the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”).
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public interest requires and what laws are appropriate to serve
the public’s needs. Courts do not normally second-guess
legislative decisions.
For harms caused by speech, however, the rule is entirely
different. Measures to address speech harms (real or alleged)
are subject to heightened standards of judicial review. The
“presumption of constitutionality” that the courts normally
apply to non-speech conduct is reversed.23 Instead, courts
assessing restrictions on speech use a level of scrutiny that is
called (depending on the context) “intermediate” scrutiny or
“strict” scrutiny.24 Use of “intermediate” or “strict” scrutiny
entails active judicial review of the challenged legislation, its
effects on free expression and its putative compensating
benefits.25 The operating assumption is that any harm that
might result from speech is less serious than the harm that
results from government restrictions on it.26
Of course, as often stressed by advocates of laws to
impinge on free expression, “the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”27 There are
exceptions to the protection of speech, and we will consider
them in the discussion that follows. For the moment, however,
it suffices to say that, just because there are some exceptions to
the protection of speech, it does not follow that legislatures can
restrict speech whenever they decide it is “too harmful to be
tolerated”28 or not “worth it.”29 On the contrary, the very “point
of all speech protection . . . is to shield [speech] that in
someone’s eyes [is] misguided, or even hurtful.”30 “The First
23. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659 (2004); United States v.
Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
24. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42
(1994).
25. See infra Part II.A. Strict Scrutiny.
26. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”).
27. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
28. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
29. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
30. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574
(1995)).
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Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people
that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs.”31
II. Content Discrimination
As stated in the introduction, revenge porn laws face a
major First Amendment hurdle because their explicit and
unabashed aim is to punish and suppress disfavored speech.
As such, they constitute content discrimination and its
aggravated variants, viewpoint discrimination and speaker
discrimination (hereafter sometimes collectively referred to as,
simply, “content discrimination”). Since R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul,32 at least, the Supreme Court’s free speech cases have
come to treat content discrimination as the least tolerated
variety of governmental regulation on free expression. So even
while the freedom of speech may not be “absolute,”33 what has
become nearly absolute is the constitutional prohibition on
governmental efforts to repress disfavored ideas, facts,
viewpoints or speakers: “[A]s a general matter, . . . government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”34
The Supreme Court’s particular attention to content
discrimination has led to a division of speech restrictions into
to two major groups: restrictions that are content-neutral and
those that are content-based.35 An example of content-neutral
restrictions is one that regulates merely the time, place and
manner of expression, without regard to the ideas, facts or
31. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
32. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The history of content-discrimination
jurisprudence goes back even further, at least as far back as Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), which specifically identified content
discrimination, viewpoint (“points of view”) discrimination and speaker
discrimination (“some groups [and not] others”) as needing to be “carefully
scrutinized.” However, it is beginning with R.A.V. that the Supreme Court
has recognized content discrimination as a recurrent principal basis for its
First Amendment decisions.
33. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
34. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
35. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994); e.g.,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800-01 (1989).
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message expressed—a ban, for example, on loud, amplified
music in a public park.36 Another example is a law that is
merely meant to address the so-called “secondary effects” of
speech.37 By contrast, restrictions are content-based when they
burden or restrict speech based on its subject matter or on the
viewpoint that is expressed.38
When assessing content-neutral restrictions on speech, the
Supreme Court has been relatively amenable to balancing
harms (for example, holding that speech freedom may have to
yield to other significant governmental interests),39 but it has
been almost unbending in its protection of speech from content
discrimination. Not only does the Court hold that “content-

36. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 789 (loud, amplified music in a public park).
See e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949) (sound trucks).
37. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
(upholding a zoning law that created a zone for adult theatres). The
“secondary effects” that were the target of the laws in Renton were the blight
and other negative neighborhood impacts of theaters showing sexuallythemed movies. These secondary effects are to be distinguished from the
primary effects of speech, which refers to the effects that the speech has on
its audience, Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988), and the effects it has on
the broader society through of the effects that the speech has on listeners. See
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 394 n.7. The distinctive concept of
“secondary effects” has been somewhat difficult to nail down, but the
difference between it and “primary” effects seems to be roughly this: Whereas
the primary effects of speech are the effects of its content on listeners, the
secondary effects are the effects that dissemination has on the locations where
it occurs (ambiance, tone, property values, etc.). In any case, so far the
Supreme Court has not extended the application of the secondary-effects
doctrine beyond its original context—as a justification for upholding zoning
laws that are aimed, not at particular messages, but at preserving intangible
qualities of neighborhoods.
At any rate, “[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
‘secondary effect’” and a law that “regulates speech due to its potential
primary impact … must be considered content-based.” Barry, 485 U.S. at 321.
Likewise, “[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary
effects’ we referred to in Renton.” Id. For these reasons, arguments that
revenge porn laws might be able to pass constitutional scrutiny on a
“secondary effects” theory (that they target only emotional secondary effects,
not content) would appear to be a non-starter.
38. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642-43; Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
39. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 801; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 308 (1984).
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based regulations are presumptively invalid”40 but, with
narrow exceptions,41 such regulations must pass the highest
level of scrutiny, so-called “strict” scrutiny, in order to
overcome that presumption.42 The exacting test of strict
scrutiny applies to any “regulations reflecting ‘aversion’ to
what ‘disfavored speakers’ have to say,”43 and that is exactly
what the currently enacted and proposed revenge porn laws
are—regulations reflecting a legislative “aversion” to what
“disfavored speakers” have to say.
To be sure, even when restrictions on speech are based on
content, they are not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny. The
Supreme Court has recognized a number of special kinds of
cases in which content-based restrictions are constitutionally
weighed under less strict standards.44 Most of these special
kinds of cases (such as the rules for school speech, governmentemployee speech or broadcast speech) have little or no broad
applicability to the social problems posed by revenge porn.
Two, however, offer some promise and, together with the
possibility of passing strict scrutiny, they give us the following
three possible theories in support of laws designed to reduce
the harms, particularly the emotional and privacy harms,
which revenge porn can produce:

40. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). See
also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
41. See infra Part II.B. Categorical Exceptions.
42. See infra Part II.A. Strict Scrutiny.
43. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (describing
reasoning in Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 658).
44. The situations in which regulations of speech are not necessarily
subject to strict scrutiny would include: categorical exceptions, incidental
burdens on speech, non-public forum speech, school speech, copyrighted
content, government employee speech, speech harmful to minors,
television/radio broadcasts, commercial speech, and publicly funded speech.
While the “categorical exceptions” to First Amendment protection (first
item on this list) have not been said by the Court to include the other listed
special situations, it is not easy to see why the others should be treated
separately. For example, the special situation of “government employee
speech” (with its exception for speech on matters of public concern, see
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)) can be easily seen as
analogous to the categorical exception for defamation (with its similar
exception for public officials and figures, see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964)).
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• The statute can pass strict scrutiny
• A “categorical exception” applies
• The burdens on speech are deemed “incidental”
The three will be considered in turn.45
A. Strict Scrutiny
The level of scrutiny that a content-based restriction must
normally pass is “strict” scrutiny,46 which is, as the name
implies, a highly rigorous standard of review. Under strict
scrutiny, the aims of the First Amendment are treated as
imperatives of the first-order, not to be subordinated to
competing governmental interests except in extraordinary
cases. The Court itself has stressed: “It is rare that a regulation
restricting speech because of its content will ever be
permissible.”47 Constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther once
quipped, the Supreme Court’s highest level of scrutiny is “strict
in theory and fatal in fact.”48
45. The special situation of copyrighted content, listed in the preceding
footnote, provides another possible constitutional basis for statutes
criminalizing revenge porn, viz. the Copyright Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. Existing copyright laws may not be well suited to deal with revenge
porn effectively, but it is conceivable that new laws under the copyright
power could be designed specifically to suppress undesirable re-dissemination
of copyrightable explicit images. See Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2025 (2014); Amanda Lewendowski, Using Copyright to Combat
Revenge Porn, 3 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422 (2014). Whether,
however, the copyright power, which was meant to incentivize speech and
creativity, could be properly applied for the purpose of suppressing truth is a
question for another paper. See Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a
Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346 (2014).
46. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011);
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (citing Sable
Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
47. Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
48. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972) (internal quotation omitted). Barry McDonald has noted that “a
majority of the Court has never sustained a regulation that was strictly
scrutinized for content discrimination reasons.” Barry P. McDonald, Speech
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of
Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1365 n.63 (2006) (quoted in United
States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559 U.S. 460
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Formally speaking, in order to meet strict scrutiny a
regulation of speech must:
 serve a compelling governmental interest;
 be narrowly tailored to meet the public need; and
 lack less restrictive alternatives for achieving
government’s goal.49

the

These three elements of strict scrutiny each present
factual questions, and the government “bears the risk of
uncertainty.”50 Strict scrutiny means that, instead of deferring
to the legislature on these questions (as under the rational
basis test), courts must make their own “independent judgment
of the facts”51 and assure that “[the legislature] has drawn
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”52 Courts
“may not simply assume that the [law] will always advance the
asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of
expressive activity.”53 On the contrary, a law that burdens free
expression “requires a justification far stronger than mere
speculation about serious harms,”54 and “ambiguous proof will
not suffice.”55 Rather, the government “must demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way.”56 And, most importantly for the present
(2010)).
49. See, e.g., Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. at 813; Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 321, 329 (1998).
50. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“[T]he Government
bear[s] the burden of showing their constitutionality.”); Entm’t Merchs., 131
S. Ct. at 2739 (stating that the government “bears the risk of uncertainty”).
51. Sable Commc'ns, 492 U.S. at 129.
52. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (Kennedy,
J., plurality).
53. Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(quoting Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 803 n.22 (1984)).
54. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475
(1995) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
55. Entm't Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (2011).
56. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 664; Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union,
513 U.S. at 475 (applying same rigor as for content discrimination); see also
United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000).
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context, the government must show that the law was prompted
“by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.”57
In short, the application of strict scrutiny to revenge porn
laws will put into sharp focus the harms caused by
disseminating others’ intimate photos as well as the harms, if
any, in banning such dissemination. The harms caused by
revenge porn seem obvious and well-understood but, because
they are, so to speak, harms caused by truth, they present
themselves in an awkward posture under the First
Amendment. Dissemination of truth seems, after all, to be
exactly the kind of thing that the First Amendment exists to
protect.
1. Truth Is Harmful?
Sometimes a law restricting speech is enacted for the very
purpose of preventing dissemination of truthful information—
bluntly, to suppress truth.58 The assumption underlying such
laws is, presumably, that if people know the truth—at least
certain truths—it can be a bad thing.59 In other words, the
“harm” these laws seek to prevent is the harm that results
because the truth gets out.
So, can truth be harmful? The answer is yes and no. While
revelations of truth can undeniably cause individualized harm,
this is not the same as saying the revelations cause social
harm. Individualized harm and social harm are not the same
57. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969) (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (striking
down a law that restricts disclosure of data concerning the prescribing habits
of physicians); see United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (law
prohibiting depictions of scene of animal cruelty); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989) (names of alleged crime victims); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g
Co. 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (names of alleged juvenile offenders); Landmark
Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (information concerning an
administrative proceeding); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(names of certain crime victims).
59. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (observing, in the context of a law
restricting truthful speech: “Those who seek to censor or burden free
expression often assert that disfavored speech has adverse effects.”).
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thing.60 For example, revealing evidence of illegal or immoral
acts may cause a good deal of individualized harm to the
persons whose conduct is exposed, but it seems hard to say that
reporting crime or immorality causes social harm. In ordinary
day-to-day life, we are constantly required to repose trust in
the others with whom we deal, meaning we must repeatedly
decide whether and to what degree trust is safe and
appropriate.61 Most people would presumably prefer that these
decisions be informed rather than uninformed and, in this
regard, people may especially want to know what others have
done of which they are not especially proud. Deliberate
obstructions to the free flow of this information would be a
definite harm to the interest that people have in knowing who
among us strays beyond the bounds of the law or morality.62
60. The harms suffered in a romantic rebuff provide an obvious example.
Even though amorous rejection often leads to a lot of emotional anguish and
torment, no one thinks the “pangs of despised love” should be considered a
social harm or that refusing an unwanted relationship should be grounds for
legal redress. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
More generally, individualized harms and social harm are different
simply because people’s individual interests are often in conflict and the law
has no alternative but to choose which interests to favor, leaving the harms
to the disfavored interests as unredressable damnum sine injuria. As a
result, there are many, many individual harms that cannot be considered as
social harms.
61. An ability to trust appropriately is obviously a matter of utmost
importance in managing the riskiness inherent in dealing with other people
and it has, indeed, been observed that the human brain is “wired” to begin
judging the trustworthiness of a new acquaintance almost instantly (33
milliseconds), even before the person’s face is consciously perceived. Jonathan
B. Freeman et al., Amygdala Responsivity to High-Level Social Information
from Unseen Faces, 34 THE J. OF NEUROSCIENCE 10573 (2014), available at
http://www.jneurosci.org/content/34/32/10573.short?rss=1.
But
more
information will nearly always provide greater security and, given the costs
of unnecessary precautions, it is natural that people crave information about
others in order to make well-founded judgments about whom to trust and
how much.
62. Is the conduct that is revealed by revenge porn illegal or immoral?
Perhaps. It is, for example, a federal felony to create sexually explicit images,
even non-obscene pictures of oneself, without affixing to them certain
statements informing viewers where to find the name, birth date and other
personal information about each of the persons depicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257
(2012). While there is much to question and dislike about § 2257 in terms of
the First Amendment, it has been defended in court by successive
administrations (Bush and Obama), and it has been upheld as constitutional.
See Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
To the extent that § 2257 means that revenge porn amounts to a public
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The Supreme Court, at any rate, takes the position that
the First Amendment represents a “judgment by the American
people”63 that the harm of suppressing truth exceeds the
benefits, adding that the courts are not empowered to “revise
that judgment” or make exceptions based on “an ad hoc
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”64 To see why
the Court has taken this position—that the benefits of truth
are constitutionally deemed to exceed the detriments—consider
one of the examples of harm reported by victims of revenge
porn, viz. the loss of job opportunities after potential employers
find an applicant’s nude pictures online.65
revelation of federal felonies, the senders of revenge porn may be thought (by
some, at least) to provide an unintended public service. At any rate, it is
hard to see how the states could have a “compelling” state interest in
suppressing evidence of federal felonies.
As for the idea that revenge porn exposes “immoral” conduct, I would stress
that I, personally, see nothing inherently “immoral” about taking and
sending sexually explicit pictures of oneself, but I also realize that others are
entitled to take a different view (and probably do). See, e.g., Texting, Sexting
and the Right Thing, THE GOOD NEWS, http://www.ucg.org/video/christianliving/texting-sexting-and-right-thing/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015); Is Texting
a
Sin?,
YOUTH
PASTOR
ADAM
(Feb.
10,
2012),
http://youthpastoradamk.wordpress.com/2012/02/10/is-sexting-a-sin/.
As
elaborated in the text that follows, the point of the First Amendment is to
assure that judgments as to what information is important, morally or
otherwise, should be left to the people, not to the government.
63. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470.
64. Id.
65. See Citron & Franks, note 9, at 352 (“Common reasons for not
interviewing and hiring applicants include concerns about their ‘lifestyle,’
‘inappropriate’ online comments, and ‘unsuitable’ photographs, videos, and
information about them.”).
One may wonder who would want to work for an employer who surfs
revenge porn sites or other porn outlets where applicants’ naked photos
might appear. Because the operators of legitimate search engine sites, such
as Google, apparently try to prevent explicit photos from readily showing up
in search results, it is unlikely that an applicant’s images will pop up in
ordinary online activity. See Casey Newton, Google Tweaks Image Search to
Make
Porn
Harder
to
Find,
CNET
(Dec.
12,
2012),
http://www.cnet.com/news/google-tweaks-image-search-to-make-porn-harderto-find/. As the Supreme Court itself has noted, the only people who are
likely to find sexually explicit images on the Internet are people who look for
it. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997) (“Though such material is widely
available, users seldom encounter such content accidentally. . . . Almost all
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content. For that
reason, the ‘odds are slim’ that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by
accident. . . . [T]he receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
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Loss of job opportunities is a definite individualized harm,
not to be minimized, but it is not the whole story. The more
fundamental reason that revenge porn leads to lost opportunity
is that it conveys information that matters, at least to some
people. When revenge porn victims encounter employment
barriers, it is ultimately because, like it or not, some employers
apparently regard the fact that a person makes nude selfportraits66 as a legitimate hiring concern—employers such as
public schools, libraries, day care centers, churches, social
welfare agencies and police forces come immediately to mind.
And who is to say that employers such as restaurants,
retailers, and other organizations whose staff directly serves
the public may not have legitimate interests in knowing facts
they believe relevant to the moral caliper of their employees?67
Even apart from always-fraught questions of moral
probity, however, an employer may simply consider it
inadvisable or unnecessarily “risky” to hire people who engage
in irregular behavior or who they see as personally weird.
There are, after all, probably still a lot of employers who do not
think it is exactly normal or decent to take pictures of oneself
while not wearing clothes, having sex or the like. And even
though I may personally deplore such censoriousness as
prudish and old-fashioned, there are many others who
evidently feel differently—and in a morally pluralist society,
the mere fact we might dislike the choices that others make
does not mean we have the right to declare ourselves the
arbiter of what they should or need to know. The premise of
the First Amendment is that people should decide for
themselves what they need to know, and it is not the place of
government to make that decision for them.68
affirmative steps.”).
66. It has been estimated that eighty percent of the photos used in
revenge porn were taken by the person depicted. See Fighting Back Against
Revenge Porn, supra note 7.
67. As Susan Sontag famously opined: “Human sexuality is . . . a highly
questionable phenomenon, and . . . remains one of the demonic forces in
human consciousness.” SUSAN SONTAG, STYLES OF RADICAL WILL (1969). This
view is probably not entirely passé.
68. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“[T]he
general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess
the value of the information presented.”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc.
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1999); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
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To be sure, taking naked pictures of oneself does not
necessarily make a person immoral or “risky.”69 But it also
does not put a person into a legally protected class, either. If
there are employers who do not want employees who take
naked pictures of themselves (as there evidently are70), there is
no legal or constitutional reason why they do not have the
discretion to make such choices. And to the extent that some
think nude self-portraits are a legitimate hiring concern, there
would be definite harm if the only real evidence of people’s
nude photos were to be governmentally suppressed.71 In sum,
even though revenge porn obviously causes individualized
harm, the Constitution assumes that there would be even
greater harm in criminalizing the free flow of information
concerning the activities that it reveals.72
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 508-14 (1996).
69. Indeed, my guess is that, in a few years’ time, people will look back
and wonder what all the fuss was about—and the sooner it becomes known
that just how common it is to take such pictures, the sooner people will stop
acting as though doing so is somehow reprehensible or outré. Cf. Steven G.
Kellman, When Literature Was Dangerous, CHRON. REV. (June 13, 2014),
http://chronicle.com/article/When-Literature-WasDangerous/147039/?cid=cr&utm_source=cr&utm_medium=en
(describing
some of the 20th century history of banning books, including James Joyce’s
now highly acclaimed Ulysses, which sells 100,000 copies per year today).
70. See supra note 65. The lost job opportunities that have reportedly
already occurred show that employers have the concerns. See id.
71. Professors Citron and Franks note the possibility of making a
“distinction between the public’s legitimate interest in knowing about the
naked pictures and in actually seeing them.” Citron & Franks, supra note 9,
at 385. It is not clear, however, what this might mean in practice. Are they
suggesting that the First Amendment is satisfied as long as people are
allowed to make unsupported allegations about one another but the
government can still make it a crime to provide the evidence or proof?
72. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672 (“The choice ‘between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’
is one that ‘the First Amendment makes for us.’”).
A legislature could, of course, declare as matter of public policy that people
who take naked pictures of themselves are a legally protected class and,
having done so, constitutionally restrict flows of information used to
discriminate on that basis. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (allowing restriction of genderdesignated ads that facilitated illegal employment discrimination); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (holding that First
Amendment does not protect speech that is an integral part of a criminal
activity). It apparently may not, however, create a legally protected class by
the back-door route of restricting speech while leaving the right to
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What is more, employers are not the only ones who might
find the truth about others’ doings to be relevant to their own
needs, values and moral precepts.
People outside the
employment context also want to know about conduct
evidencing the character of the people with whom they deal.
Parents like to know about those who come into contact with
their children, people in business like to know the penchants
(and, perhaps, susceptibility to blackmail) of those they must
trust, and people who go out on dates want to know who it is
they are dating.73 True, discrimination in employment, social
relations or whatever based on posing for naked pictures may
lead to bad decisions and invidious choices, but “the fear that
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information
cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.”74
The bottom line is this: There is always a potential for
harm in truth, especially the harm of getting found out. This
potential for individualized harm from truth does not, however,
translate automatically into a governmental interest (much
less a compelling interest) in keeping others in the dark.
Indeed, the very reason that disclosures of a person’s arguably
negative or less-than-flattering qualities may cause individual
harm is precisely that the information may be valuable or
relevant to the needs and values of others—the very kind of
interest that the First Amendment is supposed to protect. So
discriminate intact. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 182-83; 44
Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508-14 (repudiating the contrary position that the
Court had taken earlier in Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding a ban on advertising of legal
gambling establishments)). In the two more recent cases, the Court backed
away from the idea, which underlay Posadas, that a legislative power to
regulate an activity includes within it the power to restrict speech that tends
to promote that activity. Compare Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46, with Greater
New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 182-83, and 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508-14.
73. Notably, perhaps, there may be no general “public” interest in these
kinds of “daily life matters” (as Professor Volokh dubbed them in his excellent
analysis), but for the majority of people, most of the time, conversational
topics like these are the ones that really count—the ones that supply the
information that people need most. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Information Privacy, and the Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People
From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32-39, 42-46 & nn.175-200
(2000).
74. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2658, 2672 (“The choice ‘between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available’
is one that ‘the First Amendment makes for us.’”).
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even if there were a “free-floating” balancing test for free
speech (which there is not75), it is not obvious that the
individualized harms caused by private information disclosures
would necessarily outweigh the harm of keeping others in
ignorance. This other side of the harm-benefit equation is
something that proponents of bans on revenge porn often
appear to overlook.
2. Truth Leads to Crime?
Another kind of harm that has been mentioned as caused
by revenge porn is that it “raises the risk of offline stalking and
physical attack.”76 This is a very serious concern, of course,
and that is why laws against stalking and physical attack exist
and should be rigorously enforced. It is elementary First
Amendment law, however, that the government cannot justify
a restriction on speech just because the speech might inspire
somebody somewhere to commit a criminal act.77 Indeed,
under the longstanding Brandenburg rule, the guarantees of
free speech and press do not allow states to forbid even the
outright advocacy “of force or . . . law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”78
3. Truth Hurts
Still another kind of harm of revenge porn, and probably
the most important, is the extreme emotional distress that it

75. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (rejecting the idea
of a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage as “startling and
dangerous”).
76. Citron & Franks, supra note 9, at 351. See also Goode, supra note 7.
77. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253-54 (2002);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1969). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514, 529-30 (2001) (noting that “[t]he normal method of deterring
unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who
engages in it. . . . But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a
law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter
conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.”).
78. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
See also supra note 72.
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can cause to the persons whose pictures are non-consensually
shared with others and, perhaps, the world. This, too, can be a
very serious harm and is not to be minimized. But it is, once
again, an individualized harm that, like most speech-harms,
can only be avoided by suppressing the flow of truthful
information that others may find valuable and useful to their
own choices and needs.
At any rate, the Supreme Court’s decisions have
acknowledged that speech can sometimes be emotionally
distressing, but the Court has never regarded this possibility
as a justification for suppressing speech. Quite the opposite,
the Court has stressed that the capacity of speech to cause
emotional distress is precisely one of the reasons why it needs
to have constitutional protection—to shelter speech from the
political backpressure that disagreeable emotive impacts can
generate.
“Speech,” the Court recently wrote, “remains
protected even when it may ‘stir people to action,’ ‘move them to
tears,’ or ‘inflict great pain.’”79 Indeed, “the point of all speech
protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in
someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.”80 Therefore,
“[s]peech does not lose its protected character . . . simply
because it may embarrass others,”81 nor can speech be
restricted or punished merely because it “may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience.”82 On the contrary, the
Court has explicitly recognized that the First Amendment is “a
defense in state tort suits . . . for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.”83
It is true that, in protecting emotionally distressing
speech, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the particular

79. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670 (emphasis added) (citing Snyder v. Phelps,
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011)).
80. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)).
81. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982).
82. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
83. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (emphasis added); see also Hustler, 485
U.S. at 56 (upholding the First Amendment as a defense). In both Snyder
and Hustler, the Court made clear that its holdings involved public figures or
matters of public interest and that it was taking no position with respect to
cases that involved only matters of purely private concern. In neither case,
however, was the Court faced with a challenge to content-discrimination.
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cases before it involved speech about public figures or matters
of public concern.84 It has carefully reserved the question of
how it might decide in a case that involved speech on matters
Perhaps this distinction
of purely private significance.85
between “public concern” and “private concern” will emerge as
a factor in future strict-scrutiny analyses and lead to a new
rule upholding restrictions on “private concern” speech that
causes emotional harm. If that ever happens, however, it
suffices for now to say that it would represent a new addition to
current First Amendment law. It would also be contrary to the
Supreme Court’s oft-mentioned view that it is not the place of
the government to judge what speech is worthwhile enough to
protect and then ban the speech that is not worth it.86 “Most of
what we say to one another lacks . . . serious value . . . but it is
still sheltered from Government regulation.”87
In sum, given the stringent standards of proof of harm
applicable to speech restrictions that discriminate based on
content, it does not seem likely that revenge porn statutes of
the kinds recently enacted or proposed would be able to survive
strict scrutiny. It bears remembering that the Supreme Court
has, in the last several years, upheld First Amendment
protection for such doubtfully beneficial speech forms as

84. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51-56 (repeatedly
stressing that plaintiff was a “public figure”).
85. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. Citron and Franks write that the Court
in Snyder “assumed that such claims could be upheld as constitutional . . . if
the expression giving rise to the claims involved purely private matters.”
Citron & Franks, supra note 9, at 382. This conclusion is, however, hard to
reconcile with the Court’s insistence that it was leaving open questions that
lay outside the facts actually at issue (i.e., involving speech on a matter of
public concern), viz.
Our holding today is narrow. . . . [A]nd the reach of our
opinion here is limited by the particular facts before us. As
we have noted, the sensitivity and significance of the
interests presented in clashes between First Amendment
and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited principles
that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of
the instant case.
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). For additional
cases, see infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
87. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479.
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animal fighting and cruelty films,88 violent video games,89
private data about doctors’ prescribing habits,90 virtual child
pornography91 and false claims of having received the Medal of
Honor.92 The Court is not quick to strike down speech it does
not like.93
B. Categorical Exceptions
Another set of potential bases for upholding revenge porn
laws are the so-called “categorical exceptions” to the First
Amendment. The categorical exceptions are “certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem.”94 The rule for categorical exceptions
is simple: If a particular speech utterance falls into one of the
recognized categories, it does not enjoy First Amendment
protections, such as the rule of strict scrutiny.95 As a result,
the government can regulate the speech with more or less96 the
same broad level of discretion and flexibility that applies in
regulating non-speech conduct.97 The list of the categorical
exceptions recognized to date is as follows:98
 Defamation
 Obscenity
 Incitement (to imminent unlawful action)
88. See id. (technically, because of the statute’s overbreadth, the Court
did not actually get to the strict-scrutiny issue in striking down the statute
down).
89. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
90. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
91. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
92. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
93. See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
94. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
95. However, speech falling into a categorical exception may still be
protected against content discrimination that is unrelated to reason the
speech falls within the exception. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
383-95 (1992).
96. See id.
97. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
98. List is drawn from the opinion in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.
2537, 2544 (2012).
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Speech integral to criminal conduct
True threats
Fraud
“Fighting words”
Child pornography
Grave and imminent threats to national security

Immediately noticeable about this list is that none of the
categorical exceptions appears to justify a comprehensive
prohibition on non-consensual posting of others’ explicit
images. The exception for defamation may, for instance,
provide an exemption for laws to punish falsehoods in revenge
porn, but laws to forbid truthful revelations would not be
covered.99 The obscenity exception may permit bans on legally
obscene revenge porn, but only perhaps at the risk of also
subjecting the obscenity’s producer to a risk of criminal
prosecution.100 And, of course, the categorical exception for
child pornography can be invoked to justify laws punishing the
dissemination of explicit images that depict persons under 18
years.101
Unfortunately, not only do none of the existing categorical
exceptions adequately fit the existing and proposed revenge
porn laws, but the Supreme Court has been clear that it is not
making new ones. On the contrary, the Court has repeatedly
stressed, the list of exceptions is confined to a few “historic and
traditional categories . . . long familiar to the bar”102 and it has
denied that there is any “freewheeling authority to declare new
categories of speech outside the scope of the First

99. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
100. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43 (1973); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 507 (1957). If it is true that eighty percent of revenge
porn images were originally produced by the persons depicted, see Fighting
Back Against Revenge Porn, supra note 7, pursuing the images as obscenity
may have unintended negative consequences for the victims. See 18 U.S.C. §
2257, discussed in supra note 62 and accompanying text.
101. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
102. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (citing and quoting United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) and Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).
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Amendment.”103 In particular, the Court has flatly rejected the
idea that courts can “create new categories of unprotected
speech by applying a ‘simple balancing test’ that weighs the
value of a particular category of speech against its social costs
and then punishes . . . speech if it fails the test”—calling the
notion “startling and dangerous.”104
In short, “without persuasive evidence that a novel
restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription,”105 having “a historical
foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition,”106 it is very
doubtful there will be any additions to the list of categorical
exceptions. The fact that the list of categorical exceptions
appears to be essentially closed makes it particularly
important to note what the list does not include. The list of
items not included is not a short one:
Not Among the Categorical Exceptions to First Amendment:














Offensive speech
Badly motivated speech
Outrageous speech
Trifling and banal speech
Emotionally distressing speech
Pornography (non-”obscene”)
Private information disclosures
Non-consented to speech
“Harmful” speech (in se)
Speech re non-public figures
Low-value speech
Speech not of public concern
Entertainment speech

While something might be said with respect to each one of
these non-included categories, I will confine myself to the ones
most likely to seem relevant to the context of revenge porn
103.
104.
470).
105.
106.

Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
Entm't Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at
Id.
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
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laws.
1. Emotionally Distressing Speech
Emotional distress is an obvious harm of revenge porn.
However, as already discussed in relation to strict scrutiny,107
the fact that speech causes emotional distress is not seen as a
ground for restricting it but, to the contrary, as a reason for
protecting it.108 At any rate, based on the Court’s repeated
statements in support of protecting emotionally upsetting
speech,109 it seems fair to doubt that there is an as-yet
unnoticed “historical foundation”110 to exclude it from First
Amendment protection. Emotionally distressing speech is not
likely to be discovered among the categories of speech whose
“prevention and punishment [has] never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem.”111
2. Private Information Disclosures
By revealing pictures of intimate conduct and body parts to
the world, revenge porn can dramatically surprise the privacy
expectations of the persons depicted. The specific privacy
interest that revenge porn implicates is often called
“information privacy,” that is, the interest that a person has in
controlling others’ access to information about oneself.112 The
question is whether there might be, an as-yet undiscovered,
historical or traditional category of speech that is exempt from
107. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
108. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (“‘[T]he point of all
speech protection . . . is to shield just those choices of content that in
someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.’”) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)).
109. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
110. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. See Entm't Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2734.
111. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
112. See Volokh, supra note 73, at 2. Revenge porn can also intrude on
the victim’s privacy interest in “seclusion,” particularly if the pictures in
question were taken without the victim’s consent. However, the general
assumption in the revenge porn context (here, at least) is that the pictures in
question were created either by, or with the consent of the persons depicted
in them. Invasions of “seclusion” privacy in creating the pictures in the first
place would raise a range of other issues, which are left to other discussions.
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the rule of strict scrutiny because it conveys private
information.
In at least one case involving photographs revealing
truthful private information, the Court held the photographs
not actionable.113 However, proponents of restrictions on
private-information speech may find solace in the fact that the
Court has been careful never to say that First Amendment
rights will always trump state-created privacy rights.114 In a
number of cases where it might have been apposite to lay down
such a rule, the Court has always declined to do so.115 What is

113. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252-53 n.5
(1974). However, the Cantrell case may be of limited precedential value since
the plaintiffs had proceeded on a “false-light theory of invasion of privacy,” id.
at 249, and the Court did not discuss the “information-privacy” interest. In
addition, said the Court, the “case present[ed] no occasion to consider
whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of
liability for . . . false statements injurious to a private individual . . . .” Id. at
250.
114. See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 9, at 378-79.
115. Perhaps the leading case that discusses the prudence of reserving
the “information privacy vs. free speech” issue is Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (stating that “our cases have carefully eschewed
reaching this ultimate question” of whether truthful publication can ever be
punished). Among other important cases, one might list: Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (“The capacity of technology to find
and publish personal information, including records required by the
government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal
privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 529 (2001) (referring to the Court’s “repeated refusal to answer
categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent
with the First Amendment”); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105
(1979) (“Our holding in this case is narrow . . . there is no issue here of
privacy.”); see Landmark Commc’ns v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39 (1978);
Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 488-97 (1975); Cantrell, 419 U.S. at
250; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967). Indeed, there are several
cases in which the Court has explicitly held that it would allow greater
restrictions of speech on purely private matters. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-61 (1985); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976). In these latter cases, however, the
speech at issue was defamatory, meaning that it was already outside the
protection of the First Amendment anyway. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 450. In
that kind of context, the point of the public/private distinction is not to allow
the government to suppress private-concern speech but to prohibit the
suppression of public-concern speech. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 299 (1964). That is to say, in cases of defamatory speech, the
public/private distinction is invoked as an additional protection for speech,
not as a justification for restricting it.
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more, in its cases that have struck down restrictions on speech
revealing private information, the Court has often noted that
the speech in question, despite its private aspects, involved a
matter of public significance or concern.116
The problem is that, even though the Court has never said
that truthful speech always trumps privacy interests117 (which
it manifestly does not118), it has likewise never suggested that
privacy interests could justify bypassing the strict scrutiny rule
that normally applies in cases of content discrimination.119
That is to say, the Court has never suggested that the privacy
interests could be the basis of a categorical exception to First
Amendment protection. If there is, in fact, an informationprivacy categorical exception “long familiar to the bar,”120 this
studied omission of the Court to ever say anything at all to
acknowledge it seems, at the very least, rather odd. In any
116. See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104
(“matter of public significance”); Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88. Cf. Florida Star,
491 U.S. at 532-34 (information obtained from a public record open to public
inspection); Landmark, 435 U.S. at 838 (“truthful reporting about public
officials in connection with their public duties”); Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 491
(“obtained from public records”).
Actually, in Daily Mail, the Court arguably may not have entirely reserved
the issue, having stated, for example, that “state action to punish the
publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
standards,” Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102, and that “[a]t issue is simply the
power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile
delinquent's name lawfully obtained . . . .” Id. at 105-06. See also id. at 10102 (stating that “a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful
information . . . requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its
validity”). Moreover, the Court never quite said that the information at issue
actually involved a matter of public significance, but only that no issue of
privacy was involved. Id. at 105. Thus, the holding in Daily Mail arguably
was purely about protecting the publication of truthful information,
effectively establishing a standard of strict scrutiny for restrictions on such
publication.
117. But cf. Daily Mail, discussed in preceding footnote.
118. For example, there seems to be no real question that wiretapping
laws are constitutional as privacy protection measures despite the fact that
they punish wiretappers for disclosing truthful private information that they
illegally obtain. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526-29.
119. See supra Parts II.A–B and accompanying notes. For example, in
Bartnicki, the Court stressed that wiretap laws, whose “basic purpose . . . is
to protect the privacy of . . . communications,” do not discriminate on the
basis of content. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. See supra note 102.
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event, the Court’s silence on the issue hardly supports the
conclusion that there is such an exception.
There is also a serious policy reason for not elevating the
understandable concern for information privacy into a legal
right of persons to control what is disclosed about them. The
problem is that any such right would amount to a direct inroad
on free expression. That is to say, the interest in information
privacy (or, at least, in controlling what others disclose about
you) is directly opposed to the First Amendment interest in
protecting free speech. Put bluntly, freedom of speech and
controls on speech are simply opposite sides of the same coin.
As a result, the Court could only protect private-information
interests at the direct expense of an express constitutional
right.121
In summary, although the Court has clearly shown
concern about privacy interests, it has never even hinted that
there is a categorical exception to the First Amendment that
allows government to discriminate based on content just
because the speech in question conveys private information. It
is doubtful, therefore, that there can be said to be a historical
foundation for adding “information privacy” to the list of
categorical exceptions that exempt speech from the rule of
strict scrutiny.122
121. While the Fourth Amendment somewhat impairs or, at least,
complicates the efforts of governmental actors to invade personal private
space, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, there is no recognized constitutional right
protecting the privacy of private information as such. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S.
Ct. 746, 756-57 (2011) (expressly declining to recognize such a right); see also
id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A federal constitutional ‘right to
information privacy’ does not exist.”), and id. at 769 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that “the Constitution does not protect a right to informational
privacy”). In recently refusing to decide whether such a right exists, the
Court consciously followed “the same approach . . . that the Court took more
than three decades ago” in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) and Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Notably, all three
cases (Whalen, Nixon and Nelson) discussed only the possibility of a
constitutional right of information privacy as against the government, and
none of these cases even hinted (or “left open the question”) whether there
might be some sort of constitutional right of information privacy that would
limit the freedom to speak of other private persons. Clearly, on the law as it
now stands, to suppress the speech of private individuals in order to protect
other people’s private information would be to allow a state-created personal
right to trump a fundamental right under the federal Constitution.
122. Professor Volokh has argued that “privacy concerns might suffice to

27

242

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1

3. Speech on Matters Not of Public Concern (Low Value)
The question here is whether revenge porn might fall
within an as-yet undiscovered “historic and traditional”123
category of speech that is excluded from protection because it
does not relate to a matter of public concern.124 Although the
Court has at least once explicitly refused to recognize such a
categorical exception,125 it has also made occasional statements
suggesting that the First Amendment gives less protection to
speech on topics that are not considered important to public
debate. In the recent case of Snyder v. Phelps, for example, the
Court approvingly quoted a number of these statements, noting
for instance that “not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance,”126 and adding that “speech on ‘matters of public
concern’ . . . is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection’”127 but, “where matters of purely private
justify narrow restrictions on clearly defined kinds of speech that very rarely
have value—public or private,” suggesting nude photos or sex tapes as an
example. Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech,
Criminal Harassment Laws and Cyberstalking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 762
(2013). However, for the reasons set out supra text accompanying notes 6075, the premise of this argument—that nude photos rarely have value—
seems empirically dubious: The information that such pictures convey may
very well matter, to at least some people. While Professor Volokh may not see
much value in such photos, it is precisely because different people place
different values on information that the First Amendment leaves the
valuation of speech for the speakers and listeners to decide. See supra text
accompanying note 68 & infra notes 132-36.
123. See supra note 102.
124. There is obviously some overlap between the subject of this
subsection (speech unrelated to matters of public concern) and that of the
previous section (speech conveying purely private information). The two
classes of speech are not necessarily identical. Indeed, there could also
conceivably be a third class of speech that combines these two, i.e., speech
conveying private information that is not of public concern (as distinguished
from private information that is of public concern). There seems to be no
evidence in the cases of a “historic or traditional” basis for this combination
category, either.
125. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)(“We in no sense suggest
that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined
classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity . . .
.”).
126. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
127. Id.
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significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are
often less rigorous.”128 In other words, while “speech on public
issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection . . .
[laws] restricting speech on purely private matters do not
implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech
on matters of public interest.”129 Notably, however, these
statements in Snyder were, strictly speaking, dicta,130 and the
cases that the Court cited as original sources for the quoted
language were cases that involved kinds of speech that
normally do not merit full First Amendment protection
anyway.131
Despite the Court’s statements, such as those quoted in the
preceding paragraph, the Court has also—perhaps even more
frequently—made statements that firmly reject the idea of a
two-tiered (or multi-tiered) scheme of free-speech protection
based on the “public” value of the speech. For example, even
while the Court has noted that “[s]ome . . . ideas and
information are vital, some of slight worth,” it has insisted that
“the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented.”132
After all, the Court has observed, “[m]ost of what we say to one
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. It was dicta inasmuch as the Court found that the speech at issue
there did relate to a matter of public concern, so there was no logical
necessity to specify what rules might apply to speech that did not. Snyder,
131 S. Ct. at 1216-17.
131. The original source cases that the Snyder Court cited for the above
quotations (supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text) were Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (defamation)
and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (government-employee speech). In
these cases, the point of citing the “public concern” factor was not to justify
withholding protection from speech because it was not on a matter of public
concern but, quite the opposite, to confer protection on normally unprotected
speech by invoking an exception to an exception for the speech that is on a
matter of public concern. To run this wording from these cases in reverse
would be to convert an exception that was designed to protect speech into an
exception that suppresses it—a rather perverse result. Snyder itself did
involve speech on a matter of public concern, but Snyder did not decide that
the outcome would have been different if it had not—any implication to that
effect in Snyder would have been dictum.
132. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72 (2011) (quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
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another lacks . . . serious value . . . but it is still sheltered from
Government regulation” and even ‘[w]holly neutral futilities . . .
come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’
poems or Donne’s sermons.’”133 “Crudely violent video games,
tawdry TV shows, and cheap novels and magazines are no less
forms of speech than The Divine Comedy, and restrictions upon
them must survive strict scrutiny . . . . Even if we can see in
them ‘nothing of any possible value to society . . . they are as
much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature.’”134 The Court has considered the idea that the
rights of free speech and press are solely “the preserve of
political expression or comment upon public affairs” and flatly
rejected it.135 In short, despite some statements of the Court, it
simply cannot be taken as a general principle that legislatures
are empowered to restrict or punish speech whenever the
majority of legislators deem it to be “no essential part of any
exposition of ideas” or only of “slight social value.”136
There are, moreover, good policy reasons for rejecting the
idea that there is any sort of “public concern” pre-requisite or
qualifier on the scope of the First Amendment’s protection.
133. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2010) (emphasis
added).
134. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 (2011)
(quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
135. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); see also Connick, 461
U.S. at 147 (“[The] First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly
only to the extent it can be characterized as political. ‘Great secular causes,
with smaller ones, are guarded.’”).
136. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Interestingly, the Court’s rationale for striking down the law in Snyder was
apparently, simply, that: “What Westboro said, in the whole context of how
and where it chose to say it, is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First
Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that
the picketing was outrageous.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. Having said that,
the Court did not consider it necessary to consider whether the law would
pass strict scrutiny. In other words, in Snyder, the mere fact that the speech
in question was political speech in a public forum provided enough reason in
itself to strike down the law restricting it. Perhaps by dispensing with strict
scrutiny for such very “specially” protected speech in Snyder, the Court was
signaling to a new higher category of protected speech, while reserving the
possibility of speech restrictions being valid under the strict scrutiny rule to
cases that do not involve political speech on matters of public interest. That
is to say, maybe there is a nascent hierarchy here consisting of public-forum
political speech, which is practically inviolable, as opposed to speech that is
protected “merely” by the strict scrutiny rule.
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One reason is that, as we have already seen, people need to
have many kinds of information, not just important “public
debate” information, to make informed and intelligent
decisions in their daily lives.137 As the Supreme Court has
recognized as far back as 1940: “Freedom of discussion . . .
must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.”138 In modern times, for example, a
“consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech
often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue.”139 “If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and
open, governments must not be allowed to choose which issues
are worth discussing or debating . . . .”140
There is also another problem with placing a narrow
“public-interest” scope on First Amendment freedoms. Even
though not all speech is equally necessary to operate as a
democratic society, it would be dangerous to entrust
legislatures with the power to make decisions, binding on all,
that some speech (which it happens not to like) is unimportant
enough to be dispensed with. A First Amendment that
conferred government with the power to censor and ban socalled “unimportant” speech would give no real protection at
all.141
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed strong
137. See Volokh, supra note 73 (“daily life matters”); see generally supra
text accompanying notes 66-74. See also Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch.
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (indicating that it is not necessary for a speaker “to
spread his views before the public” in order to qualify to his message for
protection as a matter of public concern). Accord Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 387 n.11 & 388 n.13 (1987).
138 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (emphasis added).
139. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (quoting
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)). See also United States
v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (“[T]hose whose business and
livelihood depend in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem
First Amendment protection to be just as important for them as it is for other
discrete, little noticed groups.”).
140. Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38
(1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. The fundamental problem is that all the people who act in the name
of government and wield its power have interests of their own, personal and
institutional, and they are inevitably tempted to take those interests into
account when making choices, bending their biases in their own favor. These
temptations toward self-preference will apply as much to choices about
speech restrictions as to other governmental choices that they make. The
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reservations as to whether even judges should “decide on an ad
hoc basis which publications address issues of general or public
interest.”142 And this is not to mention the chilling effect on
truthful speakers if people could be punished based on afterthe-fact determinations that the truths they spoke were not of
sufficient public concern.
Perhaps most importantly, even though the Court has
frequently said that political and other public-interest speech
is entitled to the greatest protection, it has never actually held
that low-value speech is entitled to a lesser level of protection.
On the contrary, it has specifically denied (as mentioned
earlier) that there is any “freewheeling authority to declare
new categories of speech outside the scope of the First
Amendment.”143 That statement in itself suffices to conclude
that there is no historical or traditional basis for recognizing a
generic categorical exception for lower-value speech. And when
one considers some of the kinds of speech that have recently
been confirmed to have constitutional protection against
restrictive laws,144 it seems highly doubtful that the Court is
inclined to incur the risks entailed in letting government
declare classes of speech to be too unimportant for protection.
4. Badly Motivated Speech
At least one revenge porn statute expressly limits its
prohibition to disclosures that are intended to cause harm to
the person depicted.145 However, truthful speech that is
otherwise protected under the First Amendment does not lose
that protection merely because it was prompted by bad
motivations.146 The reason is that, even when an ill-motivated
persistent prevalence of corruption, both petty and grand, at every level of
government, everywhere, counsels strongly against ignoring this possibility.
142. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). See also Thornhill, 310 U.S. at
102 (“Freedom of discussion . . . must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of their period.”).
143. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).
144. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2013).
146. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964); see also FEC v.
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speaker does speak out of hatred, the “utterances honestly
believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the
ascertainment of truth.”147 Therefore based on the precedents,
there appears to be no historical or traditional basis for a “bad
motivation” that exempt speech from the requirement of strict
scrutiny under the First Amendment.
5. Non-Consented to Speech
Recently enacted and proposed revenge porn statutes
typically make their restrictions applicable only if the persons
in the pictures did not give advance consent to the disclosures
of the images in question. Consent provisos do not, however,
necessarily redeem restrictions on speech protected by the
Constitution.148
While the Supreme Court has occasionally upheld
“consent” limitations on First Amendment rights, these cases
involved statutory rights of individuals to be protected from
receiving unwanted messages or communications.149 The Court
has never even hinted that the First Amendment permits laws
that give private individuals a power of censorship, allowing
them to control the content or messages that others express.150

Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007) (“a speaker’s motivation is
entirely irrelevant”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)
(highly offensive parody).
147. Id. See generally Volokh, supra note 122, at 773-76.
148. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669-70 (2011)
(disapproving a consent proviso which, like the ones in recently enacted
revenge porn statutes, “forced [acquiescence] in the State's goal of burdening
disfavored speech by disfavored speakers”).
149. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000) (“Private
citizens have always retained the power to decide for themselves what they
wish to read, and within limits, what oral messages they want to consider.”);
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (refusal to receive
pandering mail); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (refusal to
receive literature distributed to homes).
150. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 734 n.43 (acknowledging that “prior cases
found governmental grants of power to private actors constitutionally
problematic . . . . [where] the regulations allowed a single, private actor to
unilaterally silence a speaker even as to willing listeners” and where the
Court had expressed concern that “[i]t would confer broad powers of
censorship, in the form of a ‘heckler’s veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent
speech . . . .” (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997)).
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After all, the guarantees of speech and press are fundamentally
built on the idea that people should not have to get permission
before being allowed to speak, even when they speak on
sensitive topics or express disfavored viewpoints.
The consent requirement in revenge porn laws is
essentially just another name for prior restraint—a legal
requirement to obtain “consent” before communicating.151 And
prior restraints are a form of advance censorship that are
among the least tolerated of restrictions on speech.152 While it
is true that past concerns about “‘prior restraints’ . . . relate to
restrictions imposed by official censorship,”153 a law that grants
private individuals the absolute discretion,
utterly
unconstrained by the democratic process, to totally block
dissemination of disfavored speech creates a system of
censorship that would seem to be even more questionable than
one controlled by public officials.154
The conclusion so far is this: Unless the Supreme Court
151. While it is true that the term prior restraint is “not self-defining”
and may have in itself have “slight utility,” Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 567 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), what is clear is that a process
“which requires the prior submission . . . to a censor avoids constitutional
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system” —including a requirement that
the censor bear the burden of proving that the speech content is unprotected
and that there a provision for quick judicial review. Freeman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). A reasonable way to understand the difference
between “prior restraints” and other kinds of restrictions is that prior
restraints are essentially requirements to pre-clear speech before it can be
lawfully uttered, meaning that a mere failure to pre-clear is subject to a
sanction irrespective of whether the speech itself was otherwise subject to
sanction.
152. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (“Prior
restraints have been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases.”);
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 592 (1976) (the government “carries
a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint”); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)
(holding that prior restraints on expression come to the court with “a ‘heavy
presumption’ against its constitutional validity”); see also Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
153. Hill, 530 U.S. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). In any case,
because revenge porn laws make the targeted speech prima facie illegal to
utter, it is probably specious to say that the restraint on speech is anything
but an official prior restraint by government on speech that it officially
disfavors.
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significantly changes the law, it is very doubtful that revenge
porn laws along the lines of the ones currently enacted and
proposed can be drafted in such a way that they will either (a)
pass strict scrutiny, or (b) fit into one of the existing categorical
exceptions. However, this still leaves a third possibility for
writing a valid revenge-porn law, namely, framing it in such a
way that it can qualify under the rule permitting merely
“incidental burdens” on speech.155 In the next section we
consider the potential for fashioning a revenge porn statute
that could be upheld as a merely “incidental” burden.
C. Incidental Burdens (the O’Brien Rule)
Even when a statute is meant to regulate non-speech
conduct, it can still have “incidental” impacts on free
expression. For example, the laws forbidding trespass can
incidentally limit a speaker’s freedom to express herself on
premises where she has no right to be.156 However, statutes
that impose merely “incidental” burdens on speech do not need
to pass strict scrutiny; they are subject instead to a lesser level
of scrutiny, now known as “intermediate scrutiny.”157 Such
intermediate scrutiny requires only that the law:
 be otherwise within legislature’s constitutional power;158
 further a governmental interest that is both:
o an important or substantial interest
o unrelated to suppression of free expression; and
155. See supra text accompanying note 45.
156. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68 (1972) (“[T]his Court has never held that a
trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on
property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes
only.”).
157. The term “intermediate scrutiny” did not appear in a majority
opinion in the First Amendment context until Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (“regulations that are unrelated to
the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny”),
decades after elements of intermediate scrutiny review were first established
in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (described in the text
that immediately follows).
158. I.e., valid apart from its impacts on speech; for example, as per the
rational basis test. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
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 impose no greater burden on speech than is essential to
further the governmental interest159
This test for reviewing “incidental burdens” on speech had
its genesis in United States v. O’Brien.160 The defendant in
O’Brien had been convicted under a statute that prohibited the
destruction of draft cards (draft registration certificates).
Because the defendant had burned his draft card publicly as a
way of expressing protest, he claimed that the burning was a
form of speech, protected by the First Amendment. The Court
accepted that the act of burning could be deemed a kind of
“speech” but it upheld the conviction anyway. In doing so, the
Court reasoned that the statute had a constitutionally valid
purpose other than to regulate speech or the speaker’s message
and that the impingement on speech was merely “incidental” to
the statute’s valid non-speech-related purpose. For such
incidental impingements on speech, the Court established the
test for validity (now known as “intermediate scrutiny”) that
was set out in the preceding paragraph.
III. A Proposed Constitutional Revenge Porn Law
The “incidental burdens” rule from the O’Brien case161
offers a possible approach to drafting a law that addresses the
principal emotional harms of revenge porn without being
subject to the high hurdle of strict scrutiny. The key is to draft
a law that defines its prohibition in such a way that its burden
on speech is merely “incidental” to a valid non-speech-related
purpose, thus qualifying the law for review under O’Brien’s less
exacting intermediate-scrutiny standard. As long as the law’s
primary prohibition can qualify for and pass intermediate
scrutiny, any burden that the law incidentally imposes on
speech would be constitutionally permissible under O’Brien.
Indeed, any speech uttered in furtherance of violations of the
law would be speech integral to a criminal act and, as such,

159. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
160. Id.
161. See supra II.C.
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would fall within a categorical exception.162
To write a revenge-porn law whose burden on speech is
only “incidental,” one must take care to couch the law’s
prohibition in terms that do not show a purpose to target,
directly or indirectly, any particular speech-content as such.
For example, it would not work to simply prohibit “speech that
causes extreme emotional distress,” as this would amount to a
content-based regulation of speech.163 But what a revenge-porn
law could validly do is criminalize any act164 intended to cause
162. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298-300 (2008)
(holding that the Constitution does not protect speech that is uttered to
further the commission of a crime); accord Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See generally supra Part II.B. (Categorical
Exceptions).
The Supreme Court has not yet clearly explained the relationship between
the rule for “incidental” burdens on speech (which are subject to intermediate
scrutiny) and the rule for speech “integral” to crime (which is entirely
excluded from First Amendment protection). It seems obvious, however, that
an utterance cannot be deemed an integral part of a crime unless there is a
validly enacted “crime” for the speech to be integral to. If this assumption is
correct, then it follows that the categorical exception for speech integral to
crime can only apply if there is a predicate crime that can pass intermediate
scrutiny under the incidental-burdens rule. In other words, every speechburdening statute must, to be valid, either be at least able to pass
intermediate scrutiny or fall within a categorical exception. While most
criminal statutes should have no trouble passing the intermediate-scrutiny
test, such passage cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion, especially in the
case of crimes enacted out of an animus toward certain speech content. In
any event, it is assumed in the present discussion that the statutory
language proposed in the text would have to be able to pass intermediate
scrutiny.
163. A law that regulates speech based on its effects on listeners is
considered to be a content-based regulation. See supra note 37 and infra text
accompanying notes 170-73. And, of course, a law that specifically singles a
particular subject matter for restriction (e.g., by prohibiting only sexually
themed or nude photos that cause distress) would be even more open to
challenge as a content-based regulation of speech.
164. The word “act” as used here and in the language proposed below is
to be understood as defined in the Model Penal Code, i.e., “a bodily
movement.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(2). That is to say, it is solely the
defendant’s bodily movements (and accompanying mental state) that are
defined as elements of the crime, and not the actual result or effects that the
act may have. To be clear, my argument for the constitutionality of the
language proposed below is no way dependent on the supposed distinction
between “conduct” and “speech.” Indeed, as the Court has essentially
recognized, there is no realistic way to draw such a distinction. Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (as long as the
“conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a
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or any attempt to cause the non-speech harm of extreme
emotional distress. A very simple version of such a statute
might read as follows:
“It is a criminal offense for any person, in the
absence of a purpose to convey or disseminate
truthful information or ideas, to do any act
intended to cause or otherwise attempt to cause
extreme emotional distress to another person.”
While it is true that the res gestae of this crime might
usually consist mainly of speech, the fact that speech is used as
a means to accomplish a criminal result or attempt does not
mean the First Amendment shields the perpetrator’s actions.165
For example, the Supreme Court made clear in United States v.
Williams166 that the First Amendment permits punishment
even of pure word crimes as long as the words are spoken as an
integral part of an offense under a valid criminal statute. A
perhaps closer analogy for the proposed language is the
prohibition, contained in Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,
that forbids sex discrimination by creating a hostile workplace
environment.167 The Supreme Court has stated its approval of
this prohibition explaining that, as long as “the government
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content,
message,” the strict-scrutiny standard applies). In any event, under the
reasoning of O’Brien, the distinction is not necessary or constitutionally
useful anyway. The more realistic distinction is between conduct that conveys
message-content and other (non-expressive) conduct—and the rule is that the
former can be regulated just as much as the latter except: (1) content-based
regulations of the former are generally subject to strict scrutiny, and (2)
content-neutral regulations of the former are subject to intermediate
scrutiny, under O’Brien.
165. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 298-300; see also R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992), quoted infra text accompanying note 168.
166. 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (upholding a law that criminalizes offers to
sell child pornography or other material that the offeror describes as such).
“Many long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against
conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech . . . that is
intended to induce or commence illegal activities.” Id. Indeed, words are a
crucial component of many crimes and attempts to commit crimes (e.g.,
uttering “your money or your life,” or “how’d you like to buy some cocaine?”).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); 29 CFR § 1604.11 (1991); see also 18
U.S.C. § 242 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (2012); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 390.
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acts are not shielded from regulation merely because” of what
they express.168 Based on this reasoning, the First Amendment
does not automatically prevent enforcing Title VII to redress
workplace sexual harassment even when the harassment is
effectuated by means of speech. The reason is that Title VII:
 is targeted at employment discrimination (in essence, a
non-speech result), but
 does not restrict any particular speech, message content
or viewpoint as such.169
There is, however, an objection to this reasoning. As
Professor Volokh points out in an analogous context, when a
law restricts or punishes speech because listeners are
distressed or outraged by its content, the law should be treated
as a content-based regulation and, therefore, subject to strict
scrutiny.170 The leading case is Boos v. Barry,171 which held
168. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390 (using Title VII as an example; emphasis
added); see also Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703,
710 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Harassment law generally targets conduct, and it
sweeps in speech as harassment only when consistent with the First
Amendment.”); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir.
2001).
169. This is not to say that Title VII analysis is always simple or clear
cut. Sometimes discrimination might inhere in the very ideas that a person
expresses. For example, a campus worker might cause some of her co-workers
feel very uncomfortable by propounding serious and reasoned arguments that
old white males should not remain in college teaching (e.g., because students
don’t easily relate to them, etc.). See Should Older Academics Be Forced to
Retire?,
THESIS
WHISPERER
(Sept.
10,
2014),
http://thesiswhisperer.com/2014/09/10/older-academics-please-retire-now/. It
is said, however, that “when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims
founded solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute
imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech”—
which seems to mean that Title VII cannot be constitutionally applied
against bigoted expressive conduct, no matter how hostile it is to co-workers.
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir.
1995). See also Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 710. Even if the First Amendment
analysis under Title VII is not entirely free of doubt, however, it nonetheless
seems clear enough that the First Amendment leaves ample room for taking
verbal behavior into account in determining whether a “hostile workplace
environment” has been created or allowed. The reasoning used to uphold such
prohibitions provides a model for upholding laws that punish communicativetype acts in furtherance of purposes to cause other prohibited harms as well.
170. Volokh, supra note 122, at 769 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct.
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that regulations of speech are considered to be content
discrimination if they restrict speech based on the “direct
impact the speech has on its listeners . . . [its] emotive impact
on its audience”172 Accordingly, Professor Volokh argues, a law
can be considered a content-based regulation of speech even
when the law does not mention content at all.173 It is enough if
the law restricts speech-content based on listeners’ reactions to
it.
Whatever the merit of Professor Volokh’s arguments (and
there is much to support them174), they should not pose an
obstacle to a statute that creates an otherwise valid criminal
offense, even if it “incidentally” burdens speech. The question
is, then, whether the statutory language proposed here could
be considered to create a valid criminal offense despite the fact
that it would almost inevitably place disproportionate burdens
on certain speech.175
The first step in answering this question is to determine
whether a law embodying the above-proposed language would,
apart from its burden on speech, create a valid criminal
offense. The answer is almost certainly yes: the conduct that
the proposed language prohibits (viz. acting with an intention
to cause or otherwise attempting to cause extreme emotional
distress) is a form of socially harmful conduct that a legislature
1207, 1218-19 (2011)).
171. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
172. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321; see also Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (“Listeners' reaction to speech is not a
content-neutral basis for regulation.”).
173. Volokh, supra note 122, at 768-70.
174. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014) (upholding the
content-neutrality of a law restricting abortion-clinic picketing). In that case,
the Court made the following distinction:
If . . . the speech [in question] caused offense or made
listeners uncomfortable, such offense or discomfort would
not give the Commonwealth a content-neutral justification
to restrict the speech. All of the problems identified by the
Commonwealth here, however, arise irrespective of any
listener’s reactions.
Id. at 2532 (emphasis added).
175. The O’Brien (incidental burdens) rule “does not provide the
applicable standard for reviewing a content-based regulation of speech . . . .”
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010).
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has, at least presumptively, the constitutional power to
deter.176 That is to say, such a prohibition seems to fall easily
within the legislature’s “large discretion . . . to determine . . .
what the interests of the public require, [and] what measures
are necessary for the protection of such interests.”177
The next step is to determine whether the law could be
valid even though it would likely burden some kinds of speechcontent more than others. Again, the answer is almost
certainly yes: as the Court recently stated: “a facially neutral
law does not become content based simply because it may
To
disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”178
paraphrase the Court: “[The prohibited harms] are problems no
matter what caused them.”179 What is more, even though the
above-proposed language would punish expressive acts in
some180 of its applications, they are not punished because of the
defendant’s communicative purpose or impact181 but rather
176. Under the “rational basis” test. See supra text accompanying notes
20-22.
177. Id.
178. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. at 2531.
179. Id. Indeed, the harms in a revenge-porn case (extreme emotional
distress) are likely to be vastly more serious than the prohibit harms referred
to in the Court’s statement quoted in the text (blocking the sidewalk).
180. It goes without saying (though perhaps is not crucial) that there are
ways to inflict emotional distress other than by means of speech. It therefore
seems fair to say that a law based on the proposed language would punish
expressive acts only in “some” instances.
181. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (noting a distinction
between expressive acts that “seek to disseminate a message to the general
public” and those that that merely “intrude upon the targeted [listener], and
to do so in an especially offensive way”); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 714-18 (2000); Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d
703, 710 (9th Cir. 2010) (“For instance, racial insults or sexual advances
directed at particular individuals in the workplace may be prohibited on the
basis of their non-expressive qualities . . . as they do not ‘seek to disseminate
a message to the general public’”). While Frisby also suggested, in the
residential picketing context, that even a “broader communicative purpose”
may not save the offensive picketing in question, Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, that
suggestion may merely reflect the fact that the particular picketing in the
case—deliberately targeted to disturb the sanctity of a person’s home—
entailed geographical privacy effects that can be regulated as time, place and
manner restrictions (also subject to intermediate scrutiny). That kind of
geographical time-place-manner justification would not, however, be
applicable in cases involving communications via the Internet, which are not
location-specific. So even though revenge porn raises serious privacy
concerns, those concerns (unlike the picketing in Frisby) are content or
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because the defendant, without communicative purpose, acted
in furtherance of a legislatively prohibited objective. They are
punished because the defendant endeavored, without
communicative purpose, to produce a result that an otherwise
valid law has makes it a crime to endeavor to produce.
Unpacking the Court’s points quoted in the prior
paragraph, we can see two potentially relevant distinctions
between the “disproportionate” burdens entailed in the
statutory language proposed above and laws (such as those in
Boos v. Barry) that discriminate impermissibly based on
listeners’ reactions. First, there is the distinction between
basing speech restrictions on (a) the listener impacts that the
speaker intends to have, vs. (b) those that the speech actually
has. Second, there is the distinction between punishing a
person who acts with a communicative purpose vs. punishing
one who acts without such a purpose.
The first of these two distinctions (intended vs. actual
impacts) is, obviously, a rather nice one—perhaps too nice to be
tenable. At any rate, although the Court has apparently never
ruled on the point, there is good reason to think that the first
distinction would not be sufficient in itself to distinguish the
revenge-porn law proposed above from laws that were
disapproved in cases like Boos v. Barry.182 An argument that it
should not be sufficient might go something like this:
The fundamental point of speech is to have
impacts on listeners’ minds—increasing their
knowledge, changing their opinions, affecting
emotional states, and so on. It would therefore be
a rank evasion of the First Amendment if
legislatures could discriminate against content
and viewpoints they do not like by cagily basing
their speech restrictions, not on the actual
impacts the speech has on listeners, but on the
listener-impacts that speakers intend. Consider,
viewpoint concerns and not concerns about time, place, or manner. A speech
regulation that discriminates based on content or viewpoint concerns must,
unlike time, place and manner discrimination, pass strict scrutiny (unless the
speech falls within a categorical exception).
182. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
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for example, a law that forbids “trying to
engender feelings of hate or animosity toward
people of Sharmandian ancestry.” There may be
obvious good reasons for wanting to enact such a
law, but doing so would nonetheless be (under
this argument) a pure evasion of the First
Amendment. That is to say, there is (arguably) a
First Amendment right to urge others to feel
hate or animosity toward any group one chooses,
whether it be the innocent Sharmandians, on one
hand, or pedophiles, terrorists, drug traffickers,
cyberbullies, misogynists, capitalists, lawyers or
whatever.183
Assuming the foregoing argument is correct, then the first
of the two potential distinctions (actual vs. intended impacts on
listeners) is not in itself sufficient save a law from invalidity as
content discrimination. That is to say, there is a good
possibility the Court would find speech restrictions based on
intended listener impacts to be just as much content
discrimination as restrictions based on actual listener impacts.
That being so, the question would then be how laws like the
(invalid) Sharmandian law could be distinguished from laws
that forbid, for example, verbal conduct creating a hostile
workplace environment or inflicting extreme emotional
distress.
Assuming that, indeed, these two kinds of laws can be
constitutionally distinguished at all, the most plausible basis
would seem to focus on the defendant’s communicative
purpose—or lack thereof.
The law in the Sharmandian
example presupposes that engendering hate or animosity
183. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985);
see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Cf. Stanley v Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”). Although a
government is no doubt permitted to guide or influence public opinion, it is
not permitted to do so by banning speech that it does not favor. Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671-72 (2011)(reasoning that “a State's failure
to persuade does not allow it to hamstring the opposition” and “the State
cannot engage in content-based discrimination to advance its own side of a
debate”).
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precisely is the defendant’s communicative purpose, and it
seeks to punish, probably impermissibly, the use of
communication to further that purpose. By contrast, hostileworkplace laws and emotional-distress laws do not presuppose
a communicative purpose (such as, for instance, “seek[ing] to
disseminate a message to the general public”184), and they are
framed in such a way that they can operate irrespective of such
a purpose. The underlying legal principle to make this
distinction might be formulated like this: the application of a
statute cannot be said to be content-discrimination unless
there is purposeful communicative content for it to apply to.
When the conduct triggering coverage under a statute does not
consist of communicating a message, “then the less stringent
standard . . . announced in O’Brien for regulations of
Accordingly, the
noncommunicative conduct controls.”185
crucial distinction that may save the above-proposed revengeporn law (along with hostile-workplace laws and emotionaldistress laws) is its requirement186 that the defendant has
pursued a prohibited intention in the absence of a purpose to
communicate facts or ideas.187
184. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, quoted to similar effect in Rodriguez, 605
F.3d at 710. See generally supra note 181.
185. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010).
Note that the first part of the sentence closely tracks, but states the obverse
of, the Supreme Court’s wording at the same place, quoted supra note 164.
Notably, the seminal O’Brien case, which established the incidental-burdens
rule, took pains to make clear that the governmental interest and statutory
impingement on speech in that case were limited to the
noncommuicative aspects of the defendant’s conduct, that the defendant was
convicted solely for the noncommuicative impact of his conduct “and nothing
else.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968).
186. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 710.
187. It is possible that a lack of communicative purpose may be, in itself,
enough deprive a defendant’s acts of First Amendment protection. See Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 410-11 (1974) (reiterating that, in order for conduct to be considered
protectable as speech, the defendant must have “[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message”)). On the other hand, there is good reason to be
reluctant to establish a rule that invites courts and juries to decide that a
given archetypally communicative act (such as talking or Internet posting)
lacks communicative purpose and is, therefore, punishable. Such a rule
would, however, be less problematic if its application were limited to cases in
which it was also found that the defendant intentionally endeavored to
produce a certain result and the legislature otherwise has the power to
criminalize such an endeavor.
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If the foregoing analysis is correct, then a legislature has
presumptive power to prohibit the harm of doing acts intended
to cause extreme emotional distress and, as per Coakley, that
legislative power is not diminished by the fact that the
prohibition may “disproportionately affect speech on certain
topics.”188 Thus, the proposed statutory language should
satisfy the first prong of intermediate scrutiny for “incidental”
burdens, viz. that the prohibition be within legislature’s
constitutional power to enact. The statute employing the
proposed language also would satisfy the other three
qualifications of intermediate scrutiny (set out above), namely:
1. The government has an interest that is obviously an
important one – the emotional well-being of its
citizens.
2. That governmental interest is, in itself, unrelated to
suppression of free expression.
3. The burden on speech is “no greater than essential” to
further the government interest because the law would
define the defendant’s actions as a crime only in the
“absence of a purpose to convey or disseminate truthful
information or ideas” and it takes into account the rule
that protects even badly motivated efforts to express
the truth.189
Finally, by not limiting statute’s prohibition specifically to
explicit photographic and video images, the proposal avoids the
implication from “underinclusiveness” that the legislature’s
real aim is not to address the emotional and privacy harms of
revenge porn but, rather, to discriminate on the basis on
content against sexual messages that it does not like.190
IV. Conclusion
188. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014).
189. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
190. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1975) (“By
singling out movies containing even the most fleeting and innocent glimpses
of nudity the legislative classification is strikingly underinclusive. There is no
reason to think that a wide variety of other scenes . . . would be any less”
harmful to the alleged governmental interest); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465-67 (1980).
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It appears that most of the revenge-porn laws recently
proposed and enacted, which simply punish sexually-themed
images disseminated without consent of persons depicted, are
unconstitutional as content-based regulations of speech that
cannot pass strict scrutiny or fit within a categorical exception
to the First Amendment. However, by framing a law in such a
way that it establishes an otherwise valid non-speech crime
whose burden on speech is only incidental to that crime, a
legislature should be able to address the primary harms of
revenge porn without its law being subject to strict scrutiny as
content discrimination, viewpoint discrimination or speaker
discrimination—in the exactly same way that Title VII
presumably does not illicitly rely on any of these
discriminations to achieve its statutory goals. However, even
though there is reason to believe that a statute along these
lines could survive constitutional scrutiny as an incidental
burden on speech, one cannot be sure.191 After all, such a law
would still represent, in the final analysis, an initiative by
government to suppress speech that it does not favor, and the
basic meaning of the First Amendment is to prohibit exactly
that sort of thing.

191. See supra note 170-87. Nor is it necessarily certain that such a law
would be a good idea. See Budde, supra note 8, at 35-40. While few would
disagree that it would be nice to be rid of revenge porn, there is still the
separate question of whether it is a good idea to criminalize the infliction of
extreme emotional distress. Compare Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Case for a
Criminal Law Theory of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 5 CRIM.
L.
BRIEF
33
(2009),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/571/, with John A. Humbach, Is
America Becoming a Nation of Ex-Cons? ___ OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. ___
(forthcoming).
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